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Introduction 
When given a choice between receiving $100 in 30 days 
and $110 in 31 days, most people wait for the larger, more 
delayed reward. However, when the choice is between $100 
today and $110 tomorrow, many people shift their prefer-
ences to the smaller, immediate reward despite the same dif-
ference of $10 and one day. Reward properties—such as time 
to receipt—play a crucial role in our processing of rewards. 
However, reward processing does not only occur for individ-
ual decisions but also for social interactions; we must decide 
to either cooperate or compete with others for rewards. Hu-
mans stand out in the animal kingdom as exceptional coop-
erators, both in terms of the form that cooperation assumes 
as well as the nature of rewards attained. Regarding form, 
we are unique in the stability of our reciprocal interactions 
and in the scale of our cooperative coalitions, entailing mul-
tiple nation states in times of war. In terms of rewards, we 
are of course motivated, like all other animals, by the cen-
tral survival payoffs such as food and water but also by ab-
stract entities such as money, the promise of future support, 
and positions of power such as a king, president, or head of 
an academic department. To maintain these complicated in-
teractions and evaluate the nature of reward, we must pos-
sess a number of prerequisite cognitive abilities. Here, we 
view this problem through the lens of evolutionary biol-
ogy, asking which aspects of our cognitive machinery, and 
the social interactions it supports, are uniquely human and 
which are shared with other primates. Though we focus on 
lemurs, monkeys, and apes, we acknowledge that many of 
the processes we document are unlikely to be restricted to 
the primates, and in many cases, there is already compara-
ble evidence from other mammals and birds. We begin by re-
viewing a suite of cognitive mechanisms that are involved in 
both human and nonhuman primate reward processing. Our 
review is particularly focused on the subset of situations with 
quantifiable rewards. We then describe the kinds of social in-
teractions that are part and parcel of primate life, especially 
the highly social monkeys and apes. Lastly, we merge these 
two sections and consider how constraints on primate cogni-
tion may limit the complexity of primate social interactions.   
Primate cognition 
To set up the problem of reward processing in animals, 
we can distinguish between asocial, individually based pro-
cesses and social ones. The primary difference is whether ac-
cess to rewards entails competitive or cooperative social in-
teractions or instead can be achieved by an individual on its 
own. Some processes operate across asocial and social con-
texts. For example, an individual seeking food as a reward 
must discriminate between food and nonfood objects, quan-
tify the amount of food available and its relative value, re-
call where food is located in the environment as well as the 
timing of its seasonal availability, and inhibit the temptation 
to take a small, immediately available reward over a larger, 
more valuable but delayed reward. Social interactions add 
a layer of complexity to these processes, raising questions 
about the extent to which individuals can generate expecta-
tions about what others want and intend, their competitive 
abilities, and the value of a coalitionary partner. 
Primates are an ideal group in which to study the compara-
tive cognition of reward processing because they are phyloge-
netically closely related to humans and because primate spe-
cies vary in their life histories, mating systems, and foraging 
ecologies. Thus, we can not only explore how these different 
socioecological parameters uniquely shape each species’ capac-
ity for reward processing but also explore the extent to which 
there are more general, derived mechanisms, having evolved 
before humans diverged from their phylogenetic ancestors. 
Properties of rewards 
For folivorous, frugivorous, and omnivorous primates, 
individuals must distinguish between edible and inedible 
items, especially given the possibility of ingesting poten-
tially toxic items. For many animals, recognition of edible 
foods entails using chemical cues, color patterns, textures, 
and shapes. And in some cases, these cues or features are de-
tected in the context of social interactions. For example, in a 
study of rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta), an experimenter 
ate one of two novel food items while a subject watched. 
The experimenter then placed new copies of each these food 
items on the ground and allowed the subject to approach 
and select one. Consistently, subjects picked the food item 
eaten by the experimenter. To assess which features medi-
ated response selection, a set of follow-up conditions put 
different features into competition, using artificially created 
foods. For example, in one condition, the experimenter ate 
an orange sphere while holding a blue cube and then pre-
sented a blue sphere and an orange cube. Subjects consis-
tently picked the orange cube, showing that in the context 
of a social foraging problem, rhesus macaques use color over 
shape to identify valuable food. 
Number 
To reliably process rewards, animals must be able to quan-
tify reward amounts, either using number or some continuous 
dimension of amount such as volume. There are at least two 
naturally occurring situations in which number would ap-
pear to matter for primates: aggressive competition between 
groups and foraging for food. In black howler monkeys (Al-
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ouatta pigra) and chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), individuals 
attend to the number of competitors. Playback experiments 
demonstrate that a group of males is more likely to approach 
foreign males if the numerical odds are in their favor. Addi-
tionally, in many primate species, two or three individuals 
will form coalitions to defeat either a single dominant individ-
ual or a smaller coalition. Although these coalitions involve 
small numbers, they nonetheless require some capacity to 
quantify the number of competitors to acquire rewards such 
as mates or foraging areas. 
Studies of foraging in animals show that individuals of-
ten maximize the rate of energetic returns, choosing patches 
with more over less food. Since estimates of rates of return 
depend on quantifying amount of food consumed over time, 
researchers have asked whether animals count the pieces, es-
timate the volume, or time the foraging periods in a patch. 
For instance, when given the choice between two differ-
ent amounts of apple slices, rhesus macaques consistently 
picked two apples over one, three apples over two and four 
apples over three. But when presented with five versus four 
apple pieces, some animals picked four and some five. With-
out training, rhesus monkeys can quantify the number of 
pieces of food up to about four but thereafter appear to rely 
on a general estimate of amount. 
Based on an overwhelming number of carefully controlled 
experiments, it is now fair to say that animals have a num-
ber sense that likely consists of two naturally available sys-
tems. One system allows animals to quantify individuals up 
to about four with precision; the second allows them to ap-
proximate number but without any limits on magnitude. In 
the precise system, as evidenced by the rhesus macaque ex-
ample, primates are limited to representing four items simul-
taneously in short-term memory. Human infants and adults 
demonstrate a similar limit in a variety of tasks, suggesting 
continuity across development and across species. In the ap-
proximate system, primates can discriminate between ap-
proximate quantities using analog magnitudes, in which per-
formance is limited by the ratio between the quantities and 
is independent of absolute value. Other work on operantly 
trained rhesus macaques demonstrates that ratio determines 
numerical discrimination between quantities ranging from 1 
to 30 items. Ratio is important because it suggests that primate 
numerical competence conforms to Weber’s law, a psycho-
physical process in which the accuracy of discriminating dif-
ferent quantities scales with the magnitude of the quantities. 
Again, human infants and adults also represent large approxi-
mate numbers and show similar signature ratio limits. 
Timing 
Predicting the timing of reward availability is a critical 
capacity for primates. In many species, crucial elements of 
the diet are only seasonally available, requiring both timing 
and planning. For example, when chimpanzees discover a 
source of ripe palm nuts, they not only invest in the process-
ing of these nuts with stone hammers and anvils, but often 
leave behind particularly good hammers, retrieving them 
on future visits. Studies conducted with captive apes re-
veal that they can recall the kinds of tools needed for certain 
tasks, and retrieve them in the service of planning for future 
tasks. Based on their patterns of movement, it is also clear 
that many primates store information about fruiting cycles, 
enabling them to time the optimum period of visitation and 
harvesting. 
Like number, the capacity to time events is based on a 
mechanism that, both behaviorally and neurobiologically, 
shows the signature of the analog magnitude system that 
underlies number. Importantly, timing exhibits the sca-
lar property of Weber’s law: the variance of timing accu-
racy scales with interval magnitude and is therefore a func-
tion of the ratio between magnitudes. For instance, rhesus 
macaques showed similar accuracy levels between timing 
events with a 1:1.5 ratio, regardless of whether the discrim-
ination was 4 s vs. 6 s, 6 s vs. 9 s, 8 s vs. 12 s, or 10 s vs. 15 s. 
Unfortunately, little work has explored primate timing abil-
ities beyond a few seconds, with the exception of periodic 
timing of circadian cycles. Moreover, the work is largely re-
stricted to studies involving operant training, with no work 
on the relationship between timing and the role of social or 
ecological contexts. 
Impulsivity 
Animals must often combine quantity and temporal infor-
mation to choose between rewards available over different 
time intervals (intertemporal choice). For example, imagine a 
monkey encounters a tree full of unripe fruit and with only 
a few ripe fruit: should it spend the time and energy to con-
sume the few ripe fruit now or wait for the rest to ripen? Wait-
ing would yield a higher reward amount, but the future is un-
certain—another monkey may eat the fruit in the meantime, 
winds may knock them into a stream below, a fungus may in-
fest and spoil the perfectly good fruit. This uncertainty may 
have provided a strong adaptive benefit for impulsivity. 
Decision makers can make intertemporal choices by 
means of at least two mechanisms. The first mechanism sim-
ply assumes that the forager maximizes its food intake rate 
over repeated foraging bouts. This rate maximization ac-
count predicts that foragers should maximize the total en-
ergy gained from rewards over the total time spent acquir-
ing and processing the rewards. Evidence from operant 
experiments suggests that cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oe-
dipus) and common marmosets (Callithrix jacchus) may use 
rate maximization strategies when trading off future bene-
fits. Temporal discounting represents the second mechanism 
and involves the subjective devaluation of future rewards. 
If animals discount the future (as the example in the intro-
duction implied), delayed rewards are less valuable than im-
mediate rewards, potentially resulting in impulsive choice. 
In experiments that estimate discounting levels, subjects are 
presented with two stimuli: one associated with a small, im-
mediate reward and the other with a large, delayed reward. 
The discounting level is “titrated” by incrementally increas-
ing the delay-to-large until subjects are indifferent between 
choosing the large delayed reward and the small, immediate 
reward. Therefore, researchers can find indifference points 
between immediate and delayed rewards over a range of 
small and large reward amounts. Psychologists have exten-
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sively studied discounting in rats and pigeons, but fewer 
studies have investigated primate discounting. Surprisingly, 
the handful of primate discounting studies that have been 
conducted demonstrate that cotton-top tamarins, common 
marmosets, brown capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella), and 
rhesus macaques show similar discounting levels to rats and 
pigeons, devaluing rewards up to 50% in the first four sec-
onds of delay! 
The high levels of discounting observed for most non-
human animals suggests that when rewards are distributed 
over time, individuals place a premium on immediacy, for-
going delayed rewards. This not only puts severe constraints 
on the foraging strategies of monkeys and apes, but con-
strains other behaviors such as cooperation, territory de-
fense, and mate selection. 
Inhibitory control 
Inhibiting prepotent responses to reward is a difficult 
task for nonhuman animals. Clearly, natural selection has fa-
vored a strong drive to obtain the largest reward available. 
This is evidenced by the performance of a number of pri-
mate species on the reversed-contingency task in which sub-
jects must reach toward the smaller of two visible rewards to 
receive the larger reward. Brown and black lemurs (Eulemur 
fulvus and E. macaco), tamarins, squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sci-
ureus), rhesus macaques, orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus), goril-
las (Gorilla gorilla), bonobos, and chimpanzees all invariably 
choose the large reward, only to receive the small reward—
they seem incapable of controlling their desire to reach for 
the larger reward amount. 
The reversed-contingency task has proven difficult for 
primates to solve but not impossible. A number of tech-
niques can circumvent the inhibitory control problem. First, 
sheer repetition can allow subjects to choose the smaller 
and receive the larger food reward. Most subjects do not 
solve the task after 200 trials, though some are at chance 
rather than repeatedly choosing the smaller amount. After 
400-2500 trials, however, six rhesus macaques received the 
larger reward in over 90% of trials. Thus, massive exposure 
to the reversed contingencies can eventually trump the in-
hibitory problems. Second, imposing costs for “incorrect” 
choice can facilitate receiving the larger reward. By with-
holding all food when subjects pick the larger quantity, ma-
caques and squirrel monkeys eventually learn to pick the 
smaller quantity; tamarins stick with the losing strategy, 
picking the larger and getting nothing at all. This suggests 
that part of the failure to point to the smaller quantity is due 
to the lack of costs associated with pointing to the larger 
quantity. Finally, including a mediator between seeing the 
food and receiving the food can curb the impulse to choose 
the larger reward amount. This has been most noticeably 
documented by an experiment testing chimpanzees trained 
on the Arabic number symbols from 1-6. Instead of choos-
ing between one food treat versus four treats, the chimpan-
zees chose between a card with the numeral 1 written on its 
face and a card with the numeral 4; each card covered up 
the corresponding number of food treats. The chimpanzees 
quickly learned to pick the number 1 card and received 4 
treats, indicating chimpanzees can learn a rule like “Point 
to the one you don’t want to get the one you want”. Surpris-
ingly, once they learned this rule with symbols, they were 
incapable of generalizing to the same problem with food 
presented on its own. Therefore, it seems as though the dif-
ficulty of this task results from the chimpanzees’ strong mo-
tivation to reach for food rather than an inability to learn the 
reverse-contingency rule. 
Memory 
Memory is a multi-faceted cognitive ability with clear 
evolutionary importance. Researchers have delineated sev-
eral different types of memory that are applied to different 
types of information. Here we will focus on three types of 
memory: short-term, spatial, and episodic memory. One of 
the simplest tasks used to test short-term memory is the de-
layed-response task. In this task, a reward is placed under 
one of two (or more) identical but spatially separated stim-
uli. After a retention interval, subjects are allowed to chose 
one of the stimuli and receive the rewards if correct. Com-
parative data show that rhesus macaques are fairly good 
at remembering the location of the food item. They begin 
with about 80% accuracy after only a few seconds and drop 
to about 68% accuracy after a 15 second retention interval. 
Marmosets, however, though also starting at 80% accuracy, 
drop to 58% accuracy at 15 seconds, only slightly better than 
chance. Though some evidence suggests that the Old World 
monkeys may retain information better than the New World 
monkeys, this is by no means a universal, with capuchin 
monkeys being a notable exception to the rule. 
Spatial memory plays an important role in primate re-
ward acquisition. Recalling when and where food rewards 
are distributed is critical in foraging situations. In fact, 
some have suggested that foraging problems have posed 
strong evolutionary pressures on primate cognition, with 
species that feed on spatially and temporally variable foods 
showing higher levels of brain encephalization than species 
that feed on more stable food sources. Numerous studies 
have demonstrated strong spatial skills in primates, partic-
ularly in analogs to the radial arm maze. In this task, feeder 
stations placed throughout an enclosure are baited before 
subjects enter. After a subject finds all of the stations, re-
searchers bait only some of the stations and, following a re-
tention interval, record whether the subjects first attempt to 
feed at the previously baited stations. Most of the experi-
ments on primates show high accuracy over retention in-
tervals as long as 24 hours. As predicted by the adaptive 
specialization hypothesis, species that search over lon-
ger distances for food in the wild tend to be more accu-
rate at longer retention intervals (e.g., frugivorous golden 
lion tamarins [Leontopithecus rosalia] are more accurate than 
gummivorous Wied’s marmosets [Callithrix kulhi]). Addi-
tionally, the contingency between space and reward plays 
an important role. Common marmosets, for instance, are 
more accurate in a win-stay paradigm in which previous 
food locations predict current locations than in a win-shift 
paradigm in which subjects are not rewarded for visiting 
previously visited food stations.  
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Probably one of the most interesting and controversial 
areas of primate memory is episodic memory. There is a 
feisty debate in the literature about whether nonhuman an-
imals have the ability to mentally travel in time to recall pre-
vious experiences. The benchmark requirements for dem-
onstrating episodic memory include showing that animals 
know “what,” “where,” and “when” an experience occurred. 
Though this is difficult to study in nonlinguistic creatures, 
recent research provides suggestive evidence of episodic-
like memory in corvids and primates. For example, up to 24 
hours after receiving a particular food item from an experi-
menter, a gorilla correctly identified the food type received 
and the experimenter from which he received it. 
Theory of mind 
Another highly contentious area of primate cognition is 
theory of mind. As mentioned earlier, this aspect of primate 
cognition is not strictly about reward. Yet, the capacity to 
make inferences about what others know, desire, believe and 
intend often leads directly to cooperative and competitive re-
wards, and most of the experimental studies use food as mo-
tivator to explore these mental states. 
Early studies failed to find evidence of theory of mind 
in primates. One explanation for these failures was that 
the studies relied on animals making inferences about hu-
man mental states in contexts involving cooperation, as op-
posed to asking animals to make inferences about each other 
in the context of competition. Though several primate spe-
cies do cooperate (see below), competition is far more com-
mon and may represent the most basic form of social inter-
action among animals. To test this hypothesis, recent studies 
of monkeys and apes have used both competitive and coop-
erative tasks, contrasting conspecific pairing as well as con-
specific-heterospecific pairings. There is increasing evidence 
that monkeys and apes make inferences from seeing to 
knowing. Chimpanzees, for instance, can take the visual per-
spective of other individuals to understand whether they can 
see occluded food rewards: subordinate chimpanzees prefer-
entially approach rewards that are obscured from the view 
of dominant individuals. Rhesus monkeys show similar abil-
ities, stealing food primarily from experimenters without vi-
sual access to the food rather than from those that do have 
access. Though visual perspective taking is only one compo-
nent of having a theory of mind, it plays a significant role 
in the competitive and cooperative interactions of primates. 
What remains to be explored is whether primates go beyond 
this elemental capacity, attributing intentions, desires, and 
beliefs to others. 
Primate social interactions 
In socially living animals, such as some of the lemurs and 
most monkeys and apes, obtaining rewards is often cou-
pled with socially competitive or cooperative interactions. 
In some instances, helping another individual yields pay-
offs for the helper, while in other cases, helping is costly for 
the helper. The existence of the latter poses a puzzle given 
the generally accepted Darwinian assumption that behavior 
evolves via natural selection to provide fitness benefits to the 
individual. Specifically, what selective pressure has favored 
individuals who provide benefits to other individuals? 
Here, we address the evolution of cooperation by describ-
ing four different models (mutualism, kin selection, reciproc-
ity, and punishment), focusing on evidence from monkeys 
and apes. We operationally define cooperation as social in-
teractions resulting in a net benefit for all participants; here, 
benefit is measured in terms of increasing reproductive 
success. 
Mutualism 
The simplest type of cooperative behavior provides direct 
benefits to the cooperator, in addition to other individuals. 
Therefore, benefits to others are by-products of benefits to 
self. This model of cooperative behavior is termed by-prod-
uct mutualism. Any individual that defects (does not coop-
erate) in mutualistic situations will, by definition, do worse 
than a cooperator; therefore, in the absence of a temptation 
to defect, cooperation provides the best option. Importantly, 
mutualism does not depend on the identity of one’s partner 
and thus can occur between any members of the same spe-
cies and even members of different species. 
Mutualism is a common form of cooperation, with coop-
erative hunting providing a prime example. When multiple 
individuals cooperate to hunt the same prey, they can both 
increase the probability of successful prey capture and re-
duce the individual costs associated with hunting. Cooper-
ative hunting provides mutualistic benefits only when the 
per capita intake rate increases with group size. Therefore, 
a pair of hunters would have to capture more than twice as 
many prey items as a solitary hunter. This typically requires 
the success rate of solitary hunters to be fairly low, making 
cooperation particularly successful. Increased success com-
bined with lower hunting costs can lead to direct, immedi-
ate, and simultaneous fitness benefits for cooperative hunt-
ers, particularly when hunting small or difficult prey. For 
example, wild chimpanzees often cooperatively hunt arbo-
real monkeys. Although different populations vary, there is 
evidence that in some populations the per capita intake rate 
increases with group size, suggesting that the hunting is co-
operative. Cheaters that do not hunt are discouraged by re-
ceiving only small amounts of meat in food sharing bouts 
following a kill. Thus, it is in an individual’s best interest to 
participate in a hunt to acquire the much sought-after meat. 
In the laboratory, mutualism has been documented in a 
variety of primates including marmosets, capuchin mon-
keys, and chimpanzees. Typically, when joint action is re-
quired to receive separate benefits for each player, subjects 
succeed in cooperating. However, when food is monopoliz-
able instead of divided between players, cooperation breaks 
down. That is, when immediate rewards are available, pri-
mates cooperate. But once competition reduces the proba-
bility of reward, there is no guarantee of immediate benefit 
and no apparent mechanism capable of maintaining cooper-
ation. In a recent study of captive chimpanzees, individuals 
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confronted an opportunity to manipulate an apparatus for a 
food reward; on some trials, the focal subject had to recruit 
the help of another individual in order to manipulate the ap-
paratus and on other trials, the focal could operate the ap-
paratus alone. Subjects only recruited help when two indi-
viduals were required to obtain the food reward. Moreover, 
in a second experiment, subjects selectively recruited effec-
tive helpers over ineffective helpers, demonstrating a keen 
knowledge of the role of others in the mutualistic acquisition 
of rewards. 
Kin selection 
Whereas mutualism poses no problem for classic Darwin-
ian theory, altruistic cooperation does as the actor incurs a 
cost while benefiting another. Kin selection provided the first 
clear theoretical solution to the paradox of altruism. Individ-
uals may bias cooperation toward their genetic relatives be-
cause it helps propagate their own genes shared by common 
descent. What looks altruistic from an individual’s perspec-
tive actually serves self-interest from the gene’s view. Indi-
viduals have a certain probability of sharing a gene (r—the 
coefficient of relatedness) with relatives due to common de-
scent. If the benefits to kin discounted by this coefficient of 
relatedness outweigh the costs of helping, altruism towards 
kin can evolve. 
Kin selection may be particularly powerful in primates 
because of the close-knit family groups found in many spe-
cies. With a few notable exceptions, including chimpanzees, 
nonhuman primates follow the general mammalian pat-
tern of philopatry in which males leave their natal groups 
upon reaching reproductive maturity whereas females stay 
in their natal groups for life; consequently, most primate 
groups consist of closely related female kin and genetically 
unrelated males. Kin selection theory predicts that individ-
uals should preferentially help relatives and should help in 
proportion to their coefficient of relatedness. These types of 
quantitative predictions have proven difficult to test in pri-
mates, but there are data showing kin-directed helping, par-
ticularly in coalition formation and food sharing. 
Primates frequently form coalitions in which multiple 
individuals form an alliance in agonistic interactions with 
other group members. This is particularly prevalent in pri-
mate species with matrilineal dominance hierarchies, such 
as macaques and baboons. In these species, females often 
assist relatives in aggressive encounters with other group 
members. Notably, the probability of coalitionary support 
tapers off with increasingly distantly related kin: mothers 
almost always aid offspring but are less likely to aid nieces 
and nephews. Therefore, as relatedness increases, these pri-
mates are more likely to pay costs associated with helping 
kin. Additionally, individuals are more likely to form co-
alitions with kin than nonkin against higher-ranking oppo-
nents, suggesting that they will pay a higher cost of helping 
related individuals. Male primates can also form coalitions, 
often to guard or acquire sexually receptive females. In sit-
uations in which few mating opportunities exist for males, 
these kin-based coalitions are especially relevant because 
aiding kin helps ensure the propagation of one’s genes, 
even in the absence of direct mating opportunities. This is 
the case in red howler monkeys (Alouatta seniculus) where 
coalitions of related individuals have longer tenure in a 
troop (and therefore more mating opportunities) than un-
related individuals. Though many instances of coalition-
ary support are directed to kin, some are directed to nonkin 
and may be attributable to other benefits such as mutual-
ism and reciprocity. 
One of the most often-reported examples of apparent al-
truism is food sharing—voluntarily allowing another to 
consume food that one individual possesses. Food sharing 
is, of course, very common between mother and offspring 
for numerous primate species. However, it also occurs be-
tween grandparents and grandoffspring, siblings, and 
even adult relatives, often scaling with relatedness. In cap-
tive macaques, for instance, mother-daughter pairs (r = 0.5) 
frequently fed from the same food bin. Both grandmother-
granddaughter pairs and sister-sister pairs (r = 0.25) co-fed 
at intermediate rates, and aunt-niece pairs (r = 0.125) co-fed 
at low levels indistinguishable from unrelated pairs. Though 
it is unclear what proportion of food transfers occur between 
relatives, kin-based sharing likely explains the bulk of shar-
ing in numerous species. 
Reciprocity 
Reciprocity occurs when an individual pays a short-term 
cost of cooperation for the future benefit of a social part-
ner’s reciprocated cooperation. As a form of altruistic co-
operation, reciprocity aims to explain cooperative behavior 
among genetically unrelated individuals (thereby eliminat-
ing kin selection as an explanation) in a unique type of so-
cial interaction termed the prisoner’s dilemma. The keys 
aspects of the prisoner’s dilemma are: 1) cooperation max-
imizes the total payoff to everyone involved in the interac-
tion (mutual cooperation provides more benefits than mu-
tual defection); however, 2) any individual will receive a 
higher personal payoff by defecting, so a sizable temptation 
to cheat exists. Pursuing unilateral cooperation in this game 
is not a stable strategy. 
Theoreticians suggested that reversing roles as donor and 
recipient of altruism may reduce the temptation to defect be-
cause it largely commits individuals to invest in future co-
operation. When the fitness payoffs sum over a series of in-
teractions with the same partner, reciprocal strategists can 
reap the benefits of mutual cooperation. The reciprocal strat-
egy tit-for- tat, in which a player starts out cooperating and 
copies its opponent’s behavior in previous interactions, can 
successfully invade and dominate simulated populations of 
social partners engaging in prisoner’s dilemma games, win-
ning out over many alternative behavioral strategies. If the 
probability of interacting again exceeds a critical level, a re-
ciprocal strategy can maintain cooperation. 
Many authors have reported examples of reciprocity 
in animals, including primates, spanning such contexts as 
food sharing, grooming, and coalitions associated with mat-
ing opportunities. Unfortunately, in most cases these pur-
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ported examples of reciprocity have either never been rep-
licated or have been challenged by alternative explanations 
for the patterns of interaction, including especially kin selec-
tion and mutualism. Another alternative explanation, sym-
metry-based reciprocity, occurs when the reciprocal pattern 
can be explained by the symmetrical relationship between 
individuals. For instance, if individuals A and B interact fre-
quently and cooperate, their behavior will appear to be re-
ciprocal even though it is based on symmetrical interactions 
rather than contingent cooperation. This contrasts with cal-
culated reciprocity (such as tit-for-tat) in which individuals 
track debts owed and favors given when deciding whether 
to cooperate. 
A field study of olive baboons (Papio anubis) provided 
one of the first reports of reciprocity. Males formed coali-
tions in order to drive off rival males and gain access to re-
productively active females. Data suggested that males took 
turns reaping the benefits, implying evidence of reciproc-
ity. The robustness of this finding, however, is unclear given 
that a subsequent study of a different population of baboons 
did not find the same reciprocal patterns and a study of a 
closely related species proposed an alternative, mutualistic 
explanation. 
Another example comes from experimental tests of food 
sharing in captive capuchin monkeys. When pairs of capu-
chins were placed in adjacent chambers separated by a mesh 
partition, if individual A allowed individual B to consume 
dropped scraps of food in one particular trial, then B tended 
to allow A to gather scraps in the next trial. Because the food 
transfer is primarily passive and costs may be minimal, these 
results can be explained by a mutual tolerance between in-
dividuals. Therefore, the capuchins do not appear to be as-
sessing the costs and benefits of their actions, making calcu-
lated reciprocity an unlikely explanation of capuchin food 
transfers. 
Lastly, in a series of experiments with captive cottontop 
tamarins, subjects could pull a tool to give food to an unre-
lated recipient without getting any food for self. Tamarins 
pulled the tool most often for partners that always pulled 
and infrequently for partners that never pulled. The fre-
quency of cooperation was, however, less than 50%, and as 
each game progressed, the amount of food given dropped. 
Tamarins, therefore, maintained moderate levels of coop-
eration with other cooperators, but the degradation of co-
operation over time suggests an unstable system; in fact, 
game theoretic modeling of the data suggest that reciproc-
ity crashes if an opponent fails to cooperate on two consecu-
tive opportunities. 
In summary, there are few examples of true, calculated 
reciprocity among monkeys and apes. Most putative exam-
ples can be explained by symmetry-based reciprocity, mutu-
alism, or kin selection. Given the simplicity of the precondi-
tions for reciprocity and the apparent ubiquity of reciprocity 
in humans, it’s rarity in primates (and other animals) is sur-
prising. We take up this issue in the section on cognitive con-
straints on reward processing. 
Punishment 
Punishing individuals that defect can potentially impose 
enough costs to offset the temptation to cheat and, like rec-
iprocity, can elicit future cooperation. Punishment involves 
energetic costs and, when accomplished by means of aggres-
sion, also involves the costs of risked injury. Consequently, 
as an adaptive behavior, punishment is a selfish strategy, fa-
voring actions that ultimately benefit the punisher by elicit-
ing cooperative behavior from the recipient of punishment. 
As defined, punishment resembles reciprocity, which should 
occur when it elicits cooperative behavior directed strictly at 
the reciprocator. Despite the theoretical interest, punishment 
is not well-documented in animals; in fact, though animals 
act aggressively toward others in the context of resource de-
fense (e.g., territoriality, dominance interactions), there are 
few examples in the context of cooperation. 
Whereas punishment penalizes past behavior with the 
hope of future reward, a similar behavior called harassment 
penalizes present behavior to elicit immediate reward. Ha-
rassment occurs when an individual imposes costs such as ag-
gression on another to induce immediate cooperation, thereby 
providing instant benefits to the harasser. Harassment may 
also influence future as well as current cooperation, suggest-
ing that it can lead to punishment strategies. For instance, if 
a defector is in the process of consuming an entire food re-
source, a harasser could impose costs on the defector aimed 
at obtaining some portion of the food resource immediately. 
Whereas punishment appears relatively rare among animals, 
harassment may be more common. For instance, after captur-
ing prey, chimpanzees frequently allow other individuals to 
consume part of the meat. Observational work has demon-
strated that harassment best accounts for the pattern of food 
sharing, taking the form of individuals incessantly begging 
for food with hand gestures, grabbing at the food, and plac-
ing their hands over the mouths of the food possessors. In this 
context, harassment was costly for the food owner (food in-
take rate decreased as the number of beggars increased), own-
ers shared more often when beggars harassed frequently and 
intensely, and when sharing occurred harassment levels de-
creased. Controlled experiments corroborated these findings 
with captive chimpanzees, as well as squirrel monkeys (Sai-
miri boliviensis), a species that rarely cooperates. 
Harassment may, of course, influence future as well as 
current cooperation, suggesting that it may lead to punish-
ment strategies. One example comes from rhesus macaques. 
When individuals find food, they often give food calls, an 
altruistic act that recruits others to the food source, thereby 
potentially benefiting kin. However, individuals some-
times find food and suppress their calls. If no one detects 
these silent discoverers, they reap more food rewards than 
those who announce their discoveries. If, in contrast, they 
are detected, then they are aggressively attacked, leading 
to an even larger loss of food to the attacker. Thus, aggres-
sion yields an immediate benefit of accessing food for the at-
tacker, clearly qualifying it as a case of harassment. In addi-
tion, the aggression may have a punishing effect on silence 
by eliciting future food calls. That is, aggressive behavior in-
fluences both immediate and future benefits. 
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The cognitive psychology of a cooperator 
Many researchers have argued that the frequency of com-
plex social interactions in primates underlies the evolution 
of their cognitive abilities. Negotiating a complicated net-
work of allies and enemies, dominants and subordinates, 
and mates and competitors has created selective pressure 
for cognitive abilities such as transitive inference, theory of 
mind, and deception. Though this connection between soci-
ality and cognition has been well recognized, the cognitive 
constraints on social interaction have often been ignored. Put 
simply, much of the work on primate cognition has focused 
on how large brains enable rich social interactions instead 
of how limited cognitive abilities may constrain the range 
of social interactions. Here, we take up this “cognitive con-
straints” perspective. 
Mutualism and kin selection are both theoretically 
well-understood and empirically well-documented mod-
els of cooperation. By contrast, reciprocity and punish-
ment, while theoretically feasible, are rare among primates 
(although harassment may be more widespread). There-
fore, despite models purporting the evolutionary stability 
of all of these types of cooperation, some types occur much 
more frequently than others. Unfortunately, a strictly adap-
tive perspective has limited power to explain the frequency 
of mutualism and kin-biased cooperation and the rarity of 
reciprocity and punishment. A proximate perspective that 
links with the ultimate problem can, however, reveal how 
cognitive constraints limit or facilitate particular forms of 
cooperation. 
The proximate approach emphasizes critical aspects of 
reciprocity and punishment that differ markedly from mu-
tualism and kin-biased cooperation. In both reciprocity and 
punishment, the fitness benefits associated with coopera-
tion depend on the partner’s behavior: cooperation should 
only occur when the partner responds by reciprocating or 
punishing. When this contingent response occurs in the fu-
ture, the temporal delay introduces cognitive challenges that 
may constrain the emergence and stability of cooperation. 
Animals can easily implement strategies that yield imme-
diate benefits, such as mutualism and harassment, because 
individuals do not have to track benefits over time. With a 
time delay between cooperating and receiving return bene-
fits, however, individuals must invest in an uncertain future. 
Delayed benefits impede learning the consequences of coop-
eration, place greater demands on the capacity to recall pre-
vious interactions, and trade off short-term fitness gains for 
long-term gains. Here we highlight how several key cogni-
tive constraints play a role in mutualism, kin-biased cooper-
ation, reciprocity, and punishment, thereby uniting the two 
sections of this essay. 
Cognitive constraints on mutualism and kin-biased 
cooperation 
Because no temptation to cheat exists in mutualistic in-
teractions, individuals should always cooperate. As a re-
sult, mutualism requires no special cognitive abilities above 
and beyond the challenges inherent in the cooperative be-
havior itself. Kin-biased cooperation does, however, re-
quire additional cognitive capacities. At a minimum, it re-
quires the capacity to direct cooperative actions to related 
individuals. 
Mechanisms of kin recognition include recognition al-
leles, phenotype matching, and spatial and familiarity cues. 
The recognition allele hypothesis predicts that individuals 
can compare a particular phenotypic cue (auditory, olfac-
tory, visual, etc.) to an innately specified template. Such a 
model requires few cognitive skills other than discriminat-
ing the cue associated with relatedness. The closely related 
phenomenon of phenotypic matching occurs when an indi-
vidual compares a conspecific’s phenotypic cues to a learned 
template. This requires specialized perceptual and compu-
tational systems that detect cues at an early stage to form a 
template, then test cues against the template to discriminate 
kin. Though recognition alleles and phenotypic matching 
provide the most direct forms of kin recognition and have 
been observed in some animal species, they do not appear to 
be common mechanisms of primate kin recognition. Instead, 
primates seem to use a simple set of rules such as spatial and 
familiarity cues to discriminate kin. Often primates may use 
rules such as “be nice to individuals near your home” or 
“help those that you grew up with” to direct the benefits of 
cooperation towards kin. These familiarity mechanisms re-
quire little in the way of cognitive abilities, building on gen-
eral laws of learning by association, and seem to be wide-
spread throughout the primates. 
Cognitive constraints on reciprocity and punishment 
The original formulation of reciprocity had three require-
ments for evolutionary stability: 1) the reciprocated benefit 
must outweigh the immediate cost, 2) individuals must in-
teract repeatedly, and 3) individuals must recognize each 
other. These requirements, however, most likely underesti-
mate what is cognitively necessary for both developing and 
maintaining a system of stable reciprocity. In particular, the 
delay between the cost of a cooperative act and the bene-
fit of reciprocated cooperation introduces a number of cog-
nitive challenges. Like reciprocity, punishment can involve 
a delay between a costly act and a beneficial payoff, and in 
these cases it faces similar constraints. For this reason, we 
consider the constraints on reciprocity and punishment to-
gether, pointing to differences where appropriate. 
Individual recognition—Like kin selection, reciprocity and 
punishment require directing cooperation to others. Un-
like kin selection, however, where altruistic acts are dissem-
inated simply as a function of coefficients of genetic related-
ness, reciprocity and punishment require targeting specific 
individuals. Therefore, the delayed, contingent response re-
52 Stev e n S & Hau S er i n Enc y c l op E di a of nE ur o s c i E nc E  (2009) 
quired for both reciprocity and punishment necessitates that 
individuals can distinguish different partners. Mechanisms 
for individual recognition appear to be the norm among an-
imals, including lemurs, monkeys, and apes. Consequently, 
the paucity of evidence for reciprocity and punishment 
across primates cannot appeal to individual recognition as a 
constraint. 
Number, amount and time—Numerical abilities can play 
a key role in reciprocity when individuals must precisely 
quantify the reward amounts being reciprocated. When pri-
mates engage in a bout of reciprocity, they will either be lim-
ited to small numbers of objects in cases where the exchange 
must be precise (a banana for a banana), or they will be freed 
from this constraint where approximate exchanges are toler-
ated. The same prediction holds for cases where the currency 
is time, such as the duration of a grooming bout. If one mon-
key grooms another for 10 minutes, the groomer will most 
likely accept as fair exchange a reciprocated grooming bout 
of between 8-12 minutes. As reward quantity and time mag-
nitudes increase, quantification accuracy decreases, making 
equitable exchange more difficult and leaving opportunities 
for cheaters to exploit the judgment errors. This constraint 
only applies when variance exists in the quantity and time 
magnitudes. If the exchange is always a banana for a banana, 
these quantification abilities are superfluous. 
Inhibitory control and impulsivity—Reciprocity is itself an 
inhibitory and impulsivity problem: can an individual in-
hibit the choice of the immediate large benefit to gain the de-
layed larger benefit? Like the reversed-contingency task, the 
chooser must first reach for the undesirable over the desir-
able reward. The first move can be likened to giving away 
food. By avoiding the temptation of the larger immediate re-
ward, the first move is costly to self. As data on the reversed-
contingency task in primates show, the cost often appears 
too great and the inhibitory system too weak. 
The second move, waiting for the reciprocated benefit, is 
analogous to the intertemporal choices described earlier. In-
dividuals must choose between the immediate reward of de-
fecting and the long-term reward of cooperating. Indeed, a 
number of researchers have predicted that impulsivity can 
reduce the value of reciprocated benefits. Experimental data 
on variation in human impulsivity and cooperation validate 
the view that a preference for immediate rewards may in-
hibit reciprocity. Impulsivity correlates with cooperation 
such that individuals who prefer immediate gains also co-
operate less frequently. In parallel, blue jays (Cyanocitta cris-
tata) show stable cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma only 
following an experimental reduction in their preference for 
immediacy. Although primates have not been tested in both 
impulsivity and cooperation tasks, it seems highly probable 
that a significant constraint on their capacity for reciprocity 
emerges from their steep discounting functions. Similar abil-
ities are required for punishment: punishers must pay an im-
mediate cost of punishing to achieve a future, discounted 
reward. 
Memory—Episodic memory may very well be required to 
implement reciprocity. Because individuals must track the 
actions (“what”) of previous partners (“who”) the last time 
that they interacted (“when”), fairly sophisticated memory 
systems may be required for reciprocity. Even if episodic 
memory itself is not required, limitations in memory decay, 
interference, and capacity can also constrain the frequency of 
reciprocity and punishment. Memory decay proceeds rap-
idly over time; therefore, longer time intervals between co-
operative acts may make reciprocity and punishment more 
difficult. Even with short time delays between cooperative 
interactions and few distractions, every potential new part-
ner increases the computational load of tracking debts owed, 
favors given, and costs imposed. Keeping score of recipro-
cal obligations and punishment with the extensive social net-
work found in many primate species may place a computa-
tionally intensive burden on memory systems. Although few 
studies examine learning and memory constraints in pri-
mate cooperation, studies of human cooperation suggest that 
these constraints can pose challenges for maintaining stable 
cooperative relationships. 
Theory of mind—Understanding the knowledge of others is 
critical to strategic reasoning. “I know that you know that I 
know that you know…” is a central assumption of economic 
decision making required for rational agents to solve eco-
nomic games. If, however, natural selection acts as the “ra-
tional agent” by selecting for individuals that make good de-
cisions, this capacity may not be required for individuals if 
they use simple rules that approximate the outcome of fully 
rational choice. Therefore, it is possible for primates to im-
plement reciprocity without full theory of mind capacities. 
At present, only a few studies have attempted in integrate is-
sues concerning mental state attribution with those involved 
in cooperation. For example, recent demonstrations of visual 
perspective taking abilities in primates suggests that they 
might be able to attend to rewards that others seek, possibly 
aiding their ability to recognize cooperative situations. How-
ever, despite this evidence, recent work shows that chimpan-
zees do not demonstrate other-regarding preferences; that 
is, they do not preferentially acquire food rewards in such 
a way as to give food to others. Instead, they appear to be 
completely indifferent to how their own reward-based ac-
tions can benefit other individuals. In contrast, in the study 
of tamarins mentioned above, individuals were more likely 
to cooperate with individuals who intentionally gave food 
as an altruistic act as opposed to individuals who gave the 
same amount of food as an accidental by-product of an oth-
erwise selfish act. Further study of what monkeys and apes 
understand of the goals, beliefs, and intentions of others will 
elucidate whether limitations in these areas constrain other-
regarding preferences. 
Conclusions 
With increasingly sophisticated and ecologically relevant 
tasks, we are closing in on those aspects of reward process-
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ing and social cognition that have uniquely evolved in hu-
mans and those that evolved by common descent with other 
primates, and possibly, other nonprimate animals. We sug-
gest reward processing and social cognition are intimately 
linked, setting up cognitive constraints on the evolution of 
cooperative behavior. We do not propose that these reward 
processing constraints are immutable. If the evolutionary 
benefit of cooperation is great, selection pressure may cir-
cumvent these constraints. This, however, is likely to occur 
in a domain-specific manner rather than a domain-general 
manner. For instance, food caching species such as squir-
rels may suspend inhibitory and impulsivity problems when 
hiding nuts away for winter. Yet, this ability has evolved 
to solve a very specific problem and likely does not apply 
generally to the species’ decision-making strategies. There-
fore, domain-general cognitive systems must evolve to allow 
many of the more complex forms of cooperation. The pos-
sibly unique presence of reciprocal cooperation and punish-
ment in humans may be directly attributable to a combina-
tion of our keen number sense, patience, inhibitory control, 
memory capacity, and theory of mind. 
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